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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action is a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
to the Public Service Commission of Utah seeking to set aside 
the report and Order of the Commission dated December 31, 
1981. 
DISPOSITION AT COMMISSION 
The Commission approved a Stipulation and Agreement 
proposed by Mountain Fuel Supply Company, Wexpro Company, the 
Division of Public Utilities-, and the Committee of Consumer 
Services, allegedly carrying out the mandate of this Court in 
Committee of Consumer Services v. Public Service Commission, 
595 P.2d 871 (1979). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens seeks to 
have the Report and Order set aside. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens 
adopts pages 2-9 of the Brief of the Utah Department of 
Administrative Services. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COMMISSION'S ORDER MUST COMPLY WITH 
THIS COURT'S DIRECTION ON REMAND 
The central issue confronting this Court on this 
second appearance of these parties before it is whether the 
Commission's Report and Order of December 31, 1981 satisfies 
this Court's Order on remand in Committee of Consumer 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Services. The Commission's failure to comply with this 
Court's mandate moots all other collateral issues including 
the res judicata status of the Order which is the centerpiece 
of the Utility Shareholders claims on appeal. The principle 
that the Order and mandate on remand must be congruent is 
beyond question. This Court, in Powerine Co. v. Zion's Sav. 
Bank & Trust Co., 148 P. 2d 807, 808 (Utah 1944) held that 
inferior tribunals may not redetermine an issue in a manner 
inconsistent with an appellate court ruling. This Court's 
instructions on remand became the law of the case. 
However wise a man may be, however sound 
his judgment, and however accurate his 
knowledge and understanding; 
nevertheless, he is bound to subordinate 
to the wisdom, judgment, knowledge and 
understanding of a superior court, whose 
order is the law of the case, until 
modified or until reversed by a higher 
authority. (quoting Kelsch v. Dickson, 
71 N.D. 430, 1 NW 2d 347, 349). 
- 2 -
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Similarly, the United States Supreme Court stated in Briggs v. 
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306, (1948): 
In its earliest day this Court 
consistently held that an inferior court 
has no power or authority to deviate 
from the mandate issued by an appellate 
court ... the rule ..• has been uniformly 
followed ... (c~tations omitted). 
Decisions of administrative agencies, like those of inferior 
courts, are constrained by appellate court mandates: FCC v. 
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940); Chicago and 
North Western Transportation Co. v. United States, 574 F.2d 
926 (7th Cir. 1978); Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. National 
Labor Rel. Bd., 204 F. 2d 529 (7th Cir. 1953). 
While all parties to this action concede that the 
Commission's Order must be consistent with this Court's 
instructions on remand (see MFS Br. 20.), they diverge over 
the content and scope of the mandate. 
In Committee of Consumer Services, this Court 
reversed the Commission's Order of April 11, 1978 and remanded 
"for a hearing in accordance with the principles set forth in 
this opinion~" Committee of Consumer Services at 873. The 
majority opinion there was clear in its articulation of these 
principles and their method of implementation with the goal of 
ending 40 years of "regulatory outrage." Throughout the 
- 3 -
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Commission's "hearing" on the settlement proposal, Mountain 
Fuel, Wexpro and the Utility Shareholders stridently sought to 
characterize virtually every principle announced in Committee 
of Consumer Services as dicta and thus not binding on the 
Commission. (Tr. at 1910-1911). It is well established that 
an inferior Court may consult the opinion of the remanding 
Court for guidance in ascertaining the scope of the mandate. 
In re Sanford Fork and Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247 (1895). Having 
made such a review, however, the Court on remand must adopt as 
the law of the case everything decided above "either expressly 
or by necessary implication" Cherokee Nation v. State of 
Oklahoma, 461 F.2d 674, 678 (10th Cir. 1972), quoting Munro v. 
Post, 102 F.2d 686, 688 (2nd Cir. 1939). The duty to embrace 
both issues decided expressly and those decided by necessary 
implication as the law of the case was extended to remands to 
administrative agencies in City of Cleveland, Ohio v. Federal 
Power Commission, 561 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1977). There, the 
Court held that an administrative agency "is without power to 
do anything which is contrary to either the letter or spirit 
of the mandate construed in the light of the opinion of [the] 
Court deciding the case". City of Cleveland at 346 quoting 
Thornton v. Carter, 109 F.2d 316, 320 (8th Cir. 1940). 
The standard for review adopted in Cherokee Nation 
and City of Cleveland suggests that the terms "holding" and 
- 4 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"dictum" are less relevant in the context of appellate remand 
orders where the law of the case is at issue. The traditional 
holding versus dictum dichotomy is most applicable where the 
court is rendering a final adjudication of disputed issues 
between litigants. In this setting, there exists a more 
substantial need to carefully distinguish statements of the 
Court which fix the rights of the parties and which merit 
stare decisis status from more gratuitous utterances. Where, 
in contrast to a ruling which terminates an action, a court's 
opinion remands for further proceedings, the Court's opinion 
occupies a more active role in guiding the ongoing litigation 
to the proper result, thereby making appropriate reference by 
the inferior court to both "express decisions" and those 
"necessarily inferred". 
It was unnecessary for the Commission to journey as 
far as the realm of implication to locate its instructions 
from this Court. At minimum this Court directed the 
Commission to: 
(1) Identify and replace in Mountain Fuel accounts 
utility properties wrongfully transferred to 
Wexpro as of January 1, 1977 under the Amended 
Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
(2) Identify and replace in Mountain Fuel accounts 
utility properties wrongfully transferred to 
- 5 -
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Wexpro after January 1, 1977 under the Amended 
Joint Exploration Agreement. 
(3) Approve a transfer of a utility asset only when 
it is found to be in the public interest, not 
detrimental to the ratepayer, and for fair 
market value. 
Moreover, this Court expressly enumerated three 
"basic principles" which were to infuse the Commission's 
proceedings on remand. These included: 
(1) The principle that Mountain Fuel's duty, as a 
public utility, is to provide its customers the 
most favorable rate reasonably possible, 
consistent with its relationship of trust with 
its customers; 
(2) The principle that gain follows risk; and 
(3) The principle that profits paid by a public 
utility to an affiliate may not be included in 
the rate base - the "no profits to affiliates" 
rule. 
It is against this standard, including both the 
Commission's duty to follow this Court's mandate and to 
properly assess the scope of that mandate that the 
Commission's Order and the settlement adopted in it must be 
measured. 
- 6 -
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I I. 
THE SETTLEMENT RATIFIED BY THE COMMISSION 
IN ITS ORDER VIOLATES THIS COURT'S ORDER 
ON REMAND. 
The fact that subsequent to this Court's decision in 
Committee of Consumer Services several of the contestants 
compromised their claims and presented the Commission with a 
settlement agreement did not permit the Commission to 
disregard its remand mandate. The Utah legislature has 
granted the Commission the authority to adopt "any settlement 
proposal of the parties and (2) enter an Order based upon such 
proposal if it deems such action proper." Utah Code Ann. 
§54-7-10(1), (Supp. 1981). This statute does not, however, 
give the Commission a blank check to approve settlements. For 
example, although the statute states that the Commission may 
assess a proposed settlement against its self-defined standard 
of propriety, the Commission is clearly foreclosed from 
approving a settlement which would violate or change the law 
or bind a party contrary to law. Gorgoza v. Utah State Road 
Commission, 553 P.2d 413 (Utah 1976). Likewise, the 
Commission may not adopt a settlement which is incompatible 
with the law of the case. 
Appropriately, the United States Supreme Court's 
clearest expression of the principle that parties may not use 
- 7 -
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a settlement to avoid a court's mandate on remand involved the 
Utah Public Service Commission. Utah Public Service 
Commission v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., et al., 395 U.S. 364, 
(1969). This action was a protracted government anti-trust 
suit alleging that El Paso had violated Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act by acquiring the stock and assets of Pacific 
Northwest Pipeline. In the case's first review by the Supreme 
Court, under the name United States v. El Paso Natural Gas 
Co., 376 U.S. 651, 662, (1964), the court had ordered El Paso 
to divest itself of Pacific Northwest "without delay." The 
United States later agreed to· settle the case. The matter 
reached the Supreme Court a second time in Cascade Natural Gas 
Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, (1967). With 
respect to the consent decree then pending as settlement of 
the case, Justice Douglas said: 
We do not question the authority of the 
Attorney General to settle suits after, 
as well as before, they reach here. The 
Depa r t men t o f Ju s t i c' e , how eve r , by 
stipulation or otherwise, has no 
authority to circumscribe the power of 
the courts to see that our mandate is 
carried out. No one, except this court, 
has the authority to alter or modify our 
mandate. (citations omitted) 
386 U.S. at 136. 
- 8 -
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The Supreme Court set aside the proposed consent 
decree and remanded for additional findings and a new solution 
to accomplish its mandate of total divestiture. On remand, 
the District Court approved a divestiture plan which featured 
the creation of a "New Company" in which El Paso would retain 
5,000,000 shares of non-voting stock which would be 
convertible into common stock at the end of five years. The 
new company would also assume $170,000,000 of El Paso's bond 
and debenture indebtedness. The Utah Public Service 
Commission appealed the District Court's order, filing a 
jurisdictional statement with the Supreme Court in which it 
urged that the decree did not meet the requirements of the 
court's mandate. When the Commission later sought to dismiss 
its appeal, it was opposed by a "consumer spokesman" and 
several amici curiae. In rejecting the Commission's Motion to 
Dismiss, Chief Justice Warren stated: 
Our mandate directed complete 
divestiture. The District Court did 
not, however, direct complete 
divestiture. Neither appellant nor any 
party supporting the dismissal argues 
that the District Court did so. Rather 
they argue that the disposition made by 
the District Court was the best that 
might be made without complete 
divestiture. Clearly this does not 
comply with our mandate. 
395 U.S. 464, 470. 
The "Memorandum of Law and the Commission's Scope of 
- 9 -
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Hearing of Proposed Settlement" dated October 19' 1981, 
(Memorandum) filed by counsel for the Utah Division of Public 
Utilities and the Utah Committee of Consumer Services suggests 
that the Commission should be "guided" in its deliberations on 
the propriety of the proposed settlement by the example of the 
"Drug Case" settlements, State of West Virginia et al., v. 
Charles Pfizer & Co., et al., 314 F. Supp. 710, (S.D. New York 
1970), aff'd 440 F.2d 1079 (2nd Cir. 1971). The Memorandum 
contends that the "Drug Cases" are instructive because they 
identify the proper criteria for settling complicated class 
actions, emphasizing such factors as the likelihood of 
success, the risks and costs of further litigation, etc. 
These "criteria of Examination" assume, however, that because 
the drug cases and the so-called Wexpro matter share 
complexity and litigant endurance they are therefore analogous 
for the purpose of involving settlement criteria. This is not 
the case. One very fundamental fact distinguishes the drug 
cases from the Wexpro matter: unlike Wexpro, the "Drug Cases" 
did not involve remand from an appellate court. 
Memorandum states misleadingly that: 
Similar to Wexpro, the drug cases had 
wound their way for several years 
through. various hearings, FTC 
administrative proceedings, and several 
appeals up and back from the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. Criminal 
proceedings were also instituted prior 
- 10 -
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to the settlement against several of the 
Defendants pursuant to grand jury 
indictment. Memorandum at 2. 
A more accurate rendition of the history of the "Drug Case" 
anti-trust litigation reveals the existence of three 
independent actions: An FTC administrative complaint and 
order which was appealed to the Sixth Circuit; criminal 
proceedings against certain officers of the Defendant 
corporations which were appealed to the Second Circuit; and a 
legion of private anti-trust actions which were consolidated 
into the temporary national class and which were settled 
pursuant to the criteria enumerated in the Memorandum. 
Significantly, the District Court which ratified the "Drug 
Case" settlement was confronted with no mandate from an 
appellate court to which it was compelled to conform its 
ruling. It was free to exercise its discretion because no 
appellate court had limited it through instructions on remand. 
The contrast between the El Paso precedent and those 
of the Drug Cases illustrates in sharp relief the first of two 
fundamental and compelling reasons why the settlement 
incorporated in the Order is fatally incongruent to this 
Court's mandate on remand. The Memorandum quotes with 
emphasis from one of the Drug Cases the proposition that 
..• the very uncertainties of outcome in 
litigation as well as the avoidance of 
wasteful litigation and expense, lay 
- 11 -
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behind the Congressional infusion of a 
power to compromise. 440 F.2d 1085. 
(quoting from Florida Trailer and 
Equipment Co. v. Deal, 284 F.2d 567 (5th 
Cir. 1960. (Memorandum at 3.) 
Throughout the Commission's hearing, the settlement was lauded 
because it would end the lengthy Wexpro litigation. The 
litigation to be avoided through settlement was of two types; 
(1) that initiated by Mountain Fuel in federal forums, and (2) 
proceedings before the Commission pursuant to this Court's 
remand Order. 
The first class of litigation was stimulated by 
Mountain Fuel's unwillingness to face the consequences of this 
Court's termination of the "regulatory outrage" that permitted 
Mountain Fuel and its Shareholders to plunder its ratepayers 
for more than three decades. Doubtless shocked by the 
prospect of having to keep faith with its ratepayers in a 
relationship of trust, Mountain Fuel elected to act more in 
character by scorning its ratepayers, the Commission and this 
Court by filing applications with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission ("FERG") and initiating an action, since 
dismissed, in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service 
Commission of Utah, Civil No. C80-0710J, While Mountain Fuel 
clearly had the right to seek relief from both FERC and in 
federal court, its activities in those forums were not 
- 12 -
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cognizable by the Commission when confronted by a remand order 
of this Court. Had the Commission not been confronted with 
this Court's remand order, it, like the courts in the Drug 
Cases, could have approved the 'settlement based on any of a 
passel of rationales, including that to do so would have ended 
litigation in other forums. It would have enjoyed the breadth 
of discretion contained in its statutory grant of authority to 
approve settlements. Our legislature, however, has also 
empowered this Court to review orders of the Commission. Utah 
Code Ann . § 5 4- 7 -1 , (Supp . 198 1) • It is this Court, in turn, 
which speaks to the Commission with judicial finality. Utah 
Code Ann. §54-7-16. It is this Court's judicial voice alone 
that the Commission must heed. And, indeed, this Court did 
speak to the Commission in Committee of Consumer Services with 
a firm voice which should have deafened the Commission to the 
occasional murmurings from other forums. Mountain Fuel's 
decision to initiate multiforum litigation, like its decision 
to suspend exploration on its leasehold acreage, both in the 
wake of Committee of Consumer Services is a demonstration of 
its corporate arrogance and an affront to this Court and to 
the Company's ratepayers. These actions served no end other 
than to compel the Division, Committee, and Commission to 
retreat from the well considered principles announced by this 
Court in Committee of Consumer Services. 
- 13 -
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Simply stated, the only Wexpro litigation that 
mattered to the Commission was that remanded to it by this 
Court. By adopting the settlement, the Commission, like the 
Division and Committee, forsook its proper judicial role and 
surrendered to Mountain Fuel's strategy of litigation through 
real politik. 
The claimed benefit derived by Mountain Fuel's 
ratepayers from the end of litigation before the Commission 
was illusory, because the Commission's task on remand was 
merely to conduct a ministerial proceeding to clarify 
transferred properties as utility or non-utility in accordance 
with the three criteria set forth in Committee on Consumer 
Services and to determine net profits derived from properties 
designated as utility and declare that those profits will 
reduce rates. The limited scope of the Commission's review on 
remand was acknowledged by Mr. Justice Wilkins in his dissent 
to this Court's decision when he stated: 
What alarms me, inter alia, is that 
the Court today has actually determined, 
I believe, that the transferred property 
is utility property, notwithstanding its 
decision to remand this case for an 
evidentiary hearing at which criteria 
for classification, in the form of three 
questions are to be employed. Just a 
facial reading of the majority opinion 
with these listed criteria and the 
undisputed evidence in this case 
convince me that the Court has 
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determined today, 
hearing, that the 
utility. Why then, 
think the Court is 
judicial process 
further hearing. 
without further 
subject property is 
I ask, even though I 
in error, prolong the 
by requiring that 
Committee of Consumer Services, 
supra, at 890-91 (emphasis added). 
Mountain Fuel, Wexpro and the Utility Shareholders 
all conceded the validity of Mr. Justice Wilkins' analysis in 
their joint Petition for Certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court. These parties declared that "all that remains 
is an accounting proceeding." "Nothing remains to be done 
except the implementation of the judgment by the Utah 
Utilities Commission ••. " Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah, in Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 
et a 1 . v • Utah Co mm it tee of Consumer Services , et a 1 . , Case 
No. 79-604, before the Supreme Court of the United States, 17, 
n7. For Mountain Fuel, Wexpro, and the Utility Shareholders 
to then suggest to the Commission that it would be spared 
protracted litigation of the Wexpro matter if it would embrace 
the settlement is further evidence that these parties are not 
above resorting to duplicity to eviscerate the will of this 
Court. 
POINT III 
THE SETTLEMENT ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION 
IS PER SE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THIS COURT'S 
MANDATE ON REMAND. 
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The preceeding point urges that the Commission's 
ratification of the Settlement was improper because there was 
simply nothing to settle apart from those issues which might 
intrude on the Commission's accounting of transferred 
properties. In short, the adversarial dynamics which 
stimulate settlements were irrelevant to the Commission's 
responsibilities under the Wexpro remand order. As the 
distinction between the El Paso case and the "Drug Cases" 
illustrates, Courts and administrative agencies may not rely 
upon one universally applicable set of criteria for deciding 
on the propriety of a Settlement Proposal. The discretion to 
accept settlements is subject to the limitations imposed by 
superior tribunals. In this case, the settlement adopted by 
the Commission must be rejected because it is fundamentally 
repugnant to the judicial processes of this State and the 
specific mandate of this Court. 
A second intrinsic flaw in the very nature of the 
settlement appears upon assaying whether Mountain Fuel and its 
ratepayes received fair market value consideration for the 
utility properties transferred pursuant to the agreement. 
This Court's opinion in Committee of 
Services states: 
Any transfer of a utility asset should 
be for fair market value so an 
appropriate benefit therefrom will 
- 16 -
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redound to the credit of the ratepayers. 
Furthermore, before approving the 
transfer of a utility asset, the 
Commission should determine whether the 
transaction is detrimental to the 
ratepayer and whether it is in the 
public interest. 
Committee of Consumer Services at 878 
This language is immediately preceeded by the 
Court's three-fold criteria which the Commission was to use to 
identify utility property. Logically, before a Mountain Fuel 
asset may be transferred, it must be classified by the Court's 
criteria. The settlement does not apply the Court's criteria 
to the property transferred by its terms, nor did the 
Commission attempt to clarify the status of the transferred 
property as utility or non-utility. 
Fair market value consideration is the price which 
property would bring if sold to a willing buyer under normal 
selling conditions. Utah Assets Corp. v. Dooley Bros. Assoc., 
70 P. 2d 738 (Utah 1937). The very term, fair market value, 
implies that the forces that influence value are those of the 
marketplace. Specifically, the "fair" marketplace. The 
judicial system is not the marketplace. Indeed, most lawsuits 
can be traced to mishaps in the marketplace. Similarly, 
parties to litigation have elected to abandon the procedural 
and substantive rules, e.g. bargaining and contract, in favor 
of the procedure and law of the courts. Settlements of 
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litigation, however welcome as they may be, always arise from 
conflict and are spawned by the willingness of the disputants 
to compromise. In the context of the Wexpro dispute, the 
inability of the parties to satisfactorily compromise their 
claims prior to May 10, 1979, resulted in a judicial 
resolution to the controversy. Unwilling to abide this 
Court's ruling, Mountain 
discredited claims and the 
Fuel sought 
climate of 
to perpetuate 
conflict between 
its 
the 
parties solely for the purpose of persuading the parties whose 
claims were vindicated before this Court to abandon their 
hard-won victory. Because settlements, by definition, assume 
concessions by the parties to them, the proponents of the 
settlement of the Wexpro case cannot be taken seriously when 
they assert that Mountain Fuel ratepayers will reap the 
benefits of fair market value for transferred utility assets. 
The interjection of litigation related forces hopelessly 
distorts the ecology of the marketplace, with the result that 
fair market values undergo mutations to become fair litigation 
values. Still, any transfers of utility property must be for 
fair market value consideration. Nothing less will comply 
with this Court's mandate 
discounted by the value 
certainly not 
of Mountain 
fair market value 
Fuel's promise of 
litigation peace nor the value of retracting its threat to 
permit valuable leases expire rather than to continue 
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exploration as a regulated utility. 
Consequently, the very existence of the Settlement 
assumes an adversarial environment hostile to the concept of 
fair market value. Ey creating this environment, Mountain 
Fuel convincingly demonstrated that even after this Court's 
bold and considered decision in Committee of Consumer Services 
it was prepared to employ every judicial and extra-judicial 
weapon in its arsenal in the cause of its 
depradation of its ratepayers. 
POINT IV 
THE ORDER AND SETTLEMENT ARE IN-
CONSISTENT WITH THE REMAND ORDER OF 
THIS COURT AND PUBLIC UTILITY LAW 
REGARDING THE FAIR MARKET VALUE 
OF TRANSFERRED UTILITY PROPERTY. 
relentless 
This Court allowed Mountain Fuel a number of options 
to choose among once the transferred assets had been 
classified as utility or non-utility property. Even without 
this classification, since Mountain Fuel has now chosen one of 
these options, transferring the utility property to another 
company, the transfer must be done for fair market value. See 
Committee of Consumer Services at 878. In this case this 
means the value 
nominal sum for 
of 
the 
the gas on 
leasehold 
the property, 
interest. This 
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accomplished by the settlement and approved without 
modification by the Commission, is merely a broken-record 
replay of the transfer condemned by this Court in its prior 
opinion. There 'this Court stated: 
The classification of this property is 
of utmost importance, since this 
property is being transferred to Wexpro 
at a depreciated book value of $33.1 
million. The claimed gross revenue from 
this property for 1976 was approximately 
$39 million. An expert from Mountain 
Fuel estimated the fair market value of 
the property at $150 million. If, in 
fact, after a hearing the property-
should be classified as a utility asset, 
the ratepayers by this trans£ er, would 
be deprived of benefits to which they 
are entitled. 
595 P.2d at 877. 
Th i s s t a t em en t b y t h i s C o u r t i s c ·1 e a r : there· is a 
fair market value ascertainable on the property in question, 
this value is likely to be far in excess of depreciated book 
value, and the ratepayers are entitled to the benefit of this 
higher amount. The attempt to pacify the ratepayers by the 
complicated formula adopted in the Commission's Order is 
nothing more than a more sophisticated attempt to avoid the 
transfer of this benefit to ratepayers and to shelter it for 
the stockholders, all contrary to this Court's prior analysis 
and directive. 
Another aspect of this replay is the choice by 
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Mountain Fuel and Wexpro to avoid performing additional 
geophysical testing on the property so that a fair market 
value of the property could be ascertained. In Committee of 
Consumer Services this Court seized on the obvious disparity 
between the fair market value and the "price" at which the 
property was transferred to Mountain Fuel's subsidiary. In 
this second round of "hearings", Mountain Fuel presented no 
dollar figures on the value of the property transferred, to 
avoid any second comparison showing that the ratepayers had 
once again lost a substantial benefit: the dollar value or 
the quantity of cheap gas which would, of course, be replaced 
by other more expensive gas at ratepayer's expense. This 
avoidance of placing a dollar value on the property was 
maintained in the face of testimony by several witnesses that 
such value could be estimated and that this land included some 
of the best oil and gas property in the Rocky Mountain area. 
Certainly no royalty, particularly a 7% royalty, can 
compensate ratepayers for the cost of service gas lost by this 
Commission's Order. 
In addition to violating this Court's prior Order, 
the failure of the Commission to credit the ratepayer with the 
increased value of the utility property transferred ou.t of 
rate base violates public policy and the accepted methodology 
utilized in accounting for gains on utility property disposed 
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of. Re Detroit Edison Co., 20 P.U.R. 4th 1, 28 (Mich. PSC 
1977); Democratic Cent. Comm. of D.C. v. 
Area Transit Comm., 485 F.2d 786, 822 (D.C. 
Washington Metro. 
Cir. 19 7 3) • As a 
commentator stated: "The majority' view holds that the profit 
or gain on the disposition of items formerly in rate base 
should inure to benefit ratepayers and not investors". 
Hamberg, "Gain on Disposition of Utility Land is other Utility 
Income", Public Utilities Fortnightly, August 13, 1981. In 
this case the Commission cannot properly determine the amount 
of this benefit to ratepayers without quantifying the value of 
the assets involved. Without this quantification no 
determination of the public interest can possibly be made. 
Perhaps this lack of specific valuation was part of 
the reason that the final error alleged herein occurred: the 
Commission's failure to make findings sufficient to sustain 
its Conclusions and Order on this subject. Especially do 
Findings Nos. 9, 10, and 11 suffer from this infirmity. No 
basis is given for the "finding" that resolution of pending 
litigation is in the public interest. No basis is given for 
the "finding" that the transfer of the properties is for fair 
market value, nor for the "finding" that "adequate benefits" 
redound to the benefit of customers, assuming this is 
synonymous with the fair market value or public interest 
standards set forth in Committee of Consumer Services. 
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Finally, the· "consideration" received is found to represent 
fair market value when none of these terms are defined and no 
other basis for this determination is given other than 
"typically determined in the industry". Certainly these 
vacuous recitations do not constitute the sort of post-hearing 
determinations of public interest and fair market value which 
this Court directed be undertaken in its prior Order. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Order of the Public Service Commission 
in these matters is not in accord with this Court's mandate in 
its prior decision, it cannot be sustained. The Commission's 
Order should be reversed and the case set down for hearings as 
previously ordered. 
DATED this 
~ A. t( day of LJJ \JL-. , 1982. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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